The International Finance Corporation (IFC) , an affiliate of the World Bank, promotes the economic development of its member countries through investment in the private sector. It is the world's largest multilateral organization providing financial assistance directly in the form of loans and equity to private enterprises in developing countries.
The World Bank is a multilateral development institution whose purpose is to assist its developing member countries further their economic and social progress so that their people may live better and fuller lives.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views and policies of the International Finance Corporation or the World Bank or their Boards of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. The IFC and the World Bank do not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accept no responsibility whatsoever for any consequences of their use. Some sources cited in this paper may be informal documents that are not readily available.
The material in this publication is copyrighted. Request for permission to reproduce portions of it should be sent to the General Manager, Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS), at the address shown in the copyright notice above. FIAS encourages dissemination of its work and will normally give permission promptly and, when the reproduction is for noncommercial purposes, without asking a fee. Permission to copy portions for classroom use is granted through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., Suite 910, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, Massachusetts 01923, U.S.A.
Charles-Albert Michalet is professor of international business at the University of Paris, Dauphine, and a consultant to the Foreign Investment Advisory Service.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Michalet, Charles Albert.
Strategies of multinationals and competition for foreign direct investment : the opening of Central and Eastern Europe / Charles -Albert Michalet. p. cm. -(Foreign Investment Advisory Service, occasional paper ; 10)
Includes bibliographical references (p. ). ISBN 0-82134161-8 1. Investments, Foreign-Europe, Eastern. 2. International business enterprises-Europe, Eastern. I. Series: Occasional paper (Foreign Investment Advisory Service) ; 10. HG5430.7.A3M5 1997 332.67'3'0947-dc2l 97-47012 CIP
Introduction
Over the last two decades, more and more develof political leaders, the analyses of economic oping countries have changed their attitude on observers and the writings of journalists (Brown, foreign direct investment (FDI). Instead of fear-1993) . To be in a better position to respond to ing, limiting, or even banning FDI, these counsuch concerns and to offer correct advice to govtries have not only permitted it but indeed are ernments on their foreign investment promotion competing to attract it. Beginning with the colpolicies, FIAS decided to attempt an analysis of lapse of the Berlin Wall, many countries have whether any such trade-off exists. feared that the opening of Central and Eastern
The study involved a dual approach. On one European (CEE) countries, including the Repubhand, we surveyed a representative sample of lics of the former Soviet Union, might make European, North American and Japanese multithese areas irresistibly attractive to direct investnationals to find out how they select sites for ment, and thus divert FDI that might otherwise their direct foreign investments. On the other have gone to the less-developed economies. The hand, we tried to assess the investment attracdeveloping countries around the Mediterranean tiveness of a small sample of countries that were rim, and particularly those of North Africa, have thought susceptible to such a trade-off. A series felt most threatened by any such potential shift of interviews were conducted with European that multinational corporations (MNCs) might (45), North American (27) and Japanese (18) make in their investment strategies. Countries in firms in seven different industrial sectors (chemisub-Saharan Africa have similarly been fearfulcals, electronics, electrical equipment, telecomeven if most of them were not attracting very munications, hotels, textiles and apparel, automuch FDI even before the collapse of the COMEmotive vehicles and parts). At the same time, CON. The relative closeness of the Mediterracase studies were prepared for a group of thirnean rim countries to Central and Eastern teen sample countries, which the firms were Europe is not the only reason for this fear-Westasked to rank on an attractiveness scale of 1 to 5 ern European firms have been by far the main (in CEE, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Slosource of their inward direct investment, and vakia, and Ukraine; on the Mediterranean rim, these are the very firms that, one might suppose, Egypt, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and Turkey; would be the first to succumb to the large marand in south-east Asia Malaysia and Thailand). kets and skilled labor of members of the now-
The trade-off issue is the central focus of the defunct COMECON. interview guidelines that were used during the The idea of a "trade-off" between Mediterracompanies survey. "Trade-off" is a notion that has nean and other developing countries, and those to be very clearly defined. Great care must be of the former socialist bloc, has become someexercised in applying it to choices between regions thing of a leitmotif, in the public pronouncements or countries, if we are to avoid any semblance of "black magic". It is perhaps worthwhile therefore may be primarily destined for export. The ecoto review the analytical framework within which nomic literature on the subject employs varying this notion must be used if it is to be relevant.
terminology, depending on the theoretical When examining how consumers make ecoapproach adopted. The "business management" nomic choices, or how investors select their portapproach of Michael Porter (1991) contrasts the folio, there are two preconditions that must be "multidomestic" (or "market seeking") strategy fulfilled before we can speak of trade-offs. First, with the "global" (or "sourcing") strategy. The the notion implies a situation of scarcity, and secapproach taken by the "new international trade" ond, the goods and services among which the theorists (Markusen, 1995; Brainard, 1993) sugchoice is to be made must be substitutes. The gests a conceptual divide between "horizontal" consumer or portfolio manager has to make and "vertical" strategies. The interview guide choices, because the financial resources at hand used during the survey reflects this dichotomy of are limited. When the notion of trade-off is direct foreign investment strategies. extended to the geographic distribution of If there is a trade-off that affects investment investment flows among several alternative localocation decisions as between CEE countries and tions, we must therefore assume that there is a those of the Mediterranean rim, then certain spefixed stock of investment possibilities. This concific conditions must be present. The amount of straint, if it exists, arises from the limited quaninvestment that investors as a whole are willing tity of financial and/or human resources availto commit must be limited. In addition, the eleable to potential investors at any given time.
ments that contribute to the attractiveness of When it comes to financing multinational corpocountries in the two zones must be similar. This rate expansion, the limiting factor may be the latter condition implies that the attractiveness of firm's own resources, or those that it can borrow, different countries must be comparable, both for given its debt-equity ratio etc. With respect to investors following a multidomestic or horizonhuman resources, there may be limitations on the tal strategy and for those who have adopted a number of managerial staff available and willing global or vertical approach. to move abroad, or the number of engineers or Paying due attention to these preconditions technical people who can be spared for some allows us to establish a clearly defined frameperiod of time from their normal functions work within which the trade-off idea can be usewithin the company.
fully applied to investment site selection. But at Moreover, any trade-off between various conthe same time it deprives the analytic framework sumer goods or financial assets can only occur of a good part of its realism. It assumes a static between products or assets that are on the same world, in effect, where firms' foreign investment indifference curve from the consumer's or invesstrategies follow the rules of a zero-sum game, tor's viewpoint. Thus, if we are going to apply i.e. where a direct investment made in one counthe trade-off theory to investment site selection, try is an investment lost by another. It is hardly it will only make sense if the countries in play surprising, therefore, that the results of the surare regarded as substitutes for each other by the vey suggest some conclusions that are quite at potential investor. This means that the various odds with what might have been expected. alternative countries must have certain features
As described in the following chapters, there that can be compared in terms of the investor's are three basic the foloinghatrom our work:
selection criteria.
There are many determinants of the decision * Far from showing any generalized trade-offs to invest abroad, and hence investors must conamong the sample countries included in the sider a number of preference curves. We can survey, the results point to a basic dichotgroup these determinants, however, around two omy, and an underlying four-level hierarprime strategies that motivate most FDI. In most chy, of countries in terms of their relative cases, a firm will decide to set up facilities attractiveness. Most importantly, firms' perabroad either so that it can serve the local market ceptioris and choices among the developing directly ("market seeking"), or because the parand transition countries are focused on a ticular country possesses the right combination restricted number of countries-what we of production factors (labor, capital and natural call the "core countries"-which in our samresources) needed to manufacture a certain prodple include some in Asia and others around uct. In this latter case ("sourcing"), production the periphery of Western Europe.
(No Latin
American countries were included in our differences in factor endowments or levels sample.) It is only among this small circle of of development, such as a vertical strategy countries with comparable features that a would dictate. trade-off of some kind might occur. Yet such There are two implications of these results a trade-off is far from the most lhkely outfor country policies aimed at attracting forcome, since today the great majority of investors say they want to be present in all eign investment. First, an indispensable precondition for encouraging foreign investthese core countries at once. ment is to have a stable political and ecoInstead of showing a rough balance between nomic climate, and a transparent and noncountries selected on the basis of a global or discretionary legal and regulatory framevertical strategy and those selected on the work. Without these characteristics, a counbasis of a multidomestic or horizontal strattry is excluded from the "core". Yet, egy, the survey results show that the domiminimizing the costs of doing business and nant factor in investment decisions is the ensuring a predictable business environsize of the market and its dynamism. The ment are only a necessary condition, not a strategies of the great majority of firms are sufficient one. The aspiring host country horizontal rather than vertical-that is to must also have a dynamism that will put it, say, their strategy is focused within a homoinitially, on the investor's "long list" and geneous space embracing countries with then move it to the "short list" of priority essentially the same level of development.
locations. An investment promotion policy's With the exception of the textiles and chances of success, then, will depend on its apparel sector, direct investments in the secability to move a country out of the circle of tors we studied are not driven by potential "potential" candidates and into the circle of cost savings arising from individual country "core countries". Hungary Poland If we now look again at the question of trade-(maybe) Russia offs, we find that it is among this group of core MEDITERRANEAN countries that any trade-off will take place. These Turkey countries, in effect, present the two necessary pre-(maybe) Portugal conditions for a trade-off. In the first place, ASIA although their individual features may differ, they are all on the same indifference curve as far as Malaysia investors are concerned. That is to say, they are to some significant extent substitutes for each other. The data in Table 3 compare this summary of Secondly, most of the firms interviewed admitted the views of multinational executives with actual that their ability to invest was constrained, either FDI flows in the 1990s. With the exception of by financial considerations or by the availability Russia and Turkey, inflows to the core countries of highly-qualified managers, or by both factors. as we have identified them from the interviews Thus the other precondition for a trade-off-limare quite consistent with the actual flows; i.e. ited resources-also exists for most firms. Only a multinationals' actual investment decisions few firms said they faced no such constraints, and 5 these were largely engaged in sectors that do not interviewed, forced choices of this kind are not demand major financial resources, because direct part of any deliberate locational strategy, but investment is the exception rather than the rule.
simply reflect the need to stretch out their forThis is the case, for example, in the hotel industry, eign investment activities over a certain period where firms show a preference for "new forms of of time. They are issues of "when' or "in what investment" (Oman, 1989) such as management sequence," not questions of "yes or no." contracts, and in the textiles and apparel sector, If our interpretation of these apparently conwhere "hollow corporations" or "virtual firms" tradictory responses to the trade-off question is deal more and more with independent suppliers right, however limited its rationale, it means that that are integrated into their systems under longfirms' locational choices involve a very clear-cut term contracts of varying duration, but without ranking of countries in terms of their attractiveany actual FDI. ness. Over any given period, it implies that there From this perspective, one might be surprised will be a clear divide between countries, which to find that nearly all of the firms interviewed we can represent with four concentric circles on responded negatively to the question of whether the attractiveness chart. At the center of the they made trade-offs among countries, while at chart, in the first circle, we find the countries of the same time most of them admitted that limthe "triad", i.e. North America, Europe and ited resources oblige them to be selective as to Japan. The second circle consists of the core where they will invest. The contradiction here is countries as we have defined them. The third cirmore apparent than real, however, and in fact cle covers countries whose attractiveness is still sheds some light on the existence of a group of only potential. Finally, the last circle represents core countries. When firms answered no to the the periphery, to which are relegated all those question about trade-offs, they were referring, countries that figure on neither the short list nor often implicitly, to two very different situations.
even the long list that multinational companies The first implies a trade-off between a country have made for themselves. The world, however, that is within the core group, and one that is not;
is not cast in concrete, and no country need feel the second, a trade-off between two countries itself condenned forever, a la Dante, to remain in both of which are either inside or outside that the limbo of one or the other of these groups. select group. While the firms responded negaIndeed, as we shall discus in Chapter 3, that is tively to both hypotheses, their rationale was difthe challenge facing investment promotion poliferent in each case. With respect to the first, there cies-to make a country upwardly mobile. was no question of making a trade-off between countries that by their nature are not part of the same category. Companies in fact thought it was Site Selection and Home Country self-evident that there would be no trade-off between investing in Tunisia rather than MalayIt must be noted, first, that the list of most attracsia, or between investing in Lithuania rather tive countries as derived from responses to the than in Turkey.
survey cannot be considered exhaustive. It In the second case-choosing between two relates only to the preferences of the sample of countries within the core group-again nearly all firms interviewed, and only to the small sample firms denied making any trade-off, for the simof countries that they were asked to comment on. ple reason that they had no desire to choose one
In the course of those interviews, companies freto the exclusion of the others. On the contrary, quently mentioned China or the Czech Republic, they hoped to be able to set up in all of those two countries that did not appear in the quescountries at once. It was in this connection that tionnaire, but that would certainly have to be the issue of limited resources was mentioned, included in any full list of core countries. but it was looked upon as a temporary constraint
The classification of countries varies slightly, that had to be accepted for a time, until they depending on the home country of the firms could assemble the resources to invest in the interviewed, and the industrial sector in which remaining core countries where they had as yet they are active. It also varies depending on no presence. It might be argued, of course, from whether firms are following a market-seeking a static economic viewpoint, that such a response strategy or a cost-reduction strategy in their to the resource constraint is exactly what we investments. These differences are examined in mean by "trade-off". Yet in the eyes of the firms detail in the following paragraphs. deal with problems of cutting surplus staff Nevertheless, the effect of these factors will or restructuring bloated and unfocused not be of much benefit to the countries of Central industrial conglomerates on the way to and Eastern Europe, nor to those of the Mediterprivatization. They would rather put their ranean Rim. The major reasons cited by the firns money into "greenfield" investments, where interviewed (the majority of which were internathey can keep full control and not be forced tional trading companies, the sogo shosha, that are to make poltically unpopular decisions. in a good position to take a broad, multi-sectoral view) are corroborated by surveys conducted by * Taking advantage of Eastern Europe as a various research institutes. They can be grouped production site for industries that are being around the following themes: relocated out of Japan, either because they are too polluting for the new environmental * Market potential is the most important regulations or because they are too highly determinant of Japanese investment decilabor-intensive, or as a place to produce for sions. As Japanese firms see it, countries to West European markets, is not an idea that the east and south of the European Union, appeals to Japanese firms. Our interviews except for Russia, do not meet this condition.
Site selection by Europeanfirms
suggest two reasons for this. In the first * Japanese firms tend to take a very long-term place, the prospecting they have done in perspective in their investment decisions. In CEE has pointed up those countries' technomost cases, they have no intention of closing logical inadequacies, with respect both to down their subsidiaries in the future. The potential local subcontractors and to the current economic and political instability in supply of intermediary inputs-for examthe countries of the former Soviet Union ple, water and electricity supply are not up induces in them a "wait and see" attitude, the standards of Japan's electronics produceven if they recognize that there are tremeners. When it comes to looking for potential dous investment opportunities in certain relocation sites, it is clear that CEE locations industrial sectors where they have a comcannot compete with the newly industrialpetitive advantage, such as automobiles and ized economies of Asia. In the second place, consumer electronics.
Japanese firms do not see much cost advantage in Eastern Europe or the southern Med-* Within the ex-COMECON zone, as in the iterranean in terms of industries with heavy Mediterranean area, Japanese firms see demands for unskilled labor. They do not themselves at a disadvantage against Eurosee their EU market share as sufficiently pean companies, in particular German and large to justify the kind of production netFrench firms in the two regions respectively.
works they have set up in the least-develThey also point to the privileged relationoped economies of Asia. With their current ships with local governments that they feel level of market penetration in the EU, Japaare enjoyed by European firms. Not surprisnese firms do not feel the need to look ingly, they have no such doubts about differbeyond Portugal or Spain for sites that will ential treatment or competitive advantage allow them to reduce labor costs. These two when it comes to operating in the Pacific countries have the added advantage of zone-but they also seem to feel the same being part of the EU, which fits nicely with Japanese firms' strategic objective of becommore pronounced than in the CEE region, only ing "insiders". Finally, the firms interviewed Algeria is of much attraction to Japanese compaoften mentioned their concern about the nies, thanks to their apparent interest in local oil burden of foreign debt in many CEE counproduction and refining. tries, and the ability of those countries-parAs a final point, when Japanese firms were ticularly Poland-to find the hard currency asked about an eventual trade-off between Asian to service it. The heavy weighting of sogo countries like Thailand and Malaysia and those shosha firms in our Japanese sample no of Eastern Europe or the Mediterranean, the doubt helps to explain why this factor was immediate answer was: "They are not in the of such concern.
same category". In this regard, Japanese firms are no different from European and American ones. *In the end, the cultural gulf may go some additional way to explaining why Japanese firms are not more interested in the exSite Selection and Industrial Sector COMECON countries and those of the Mediterranean Rim. This factor indeed was an
The industrial sector to which a firm belongs can undercurrent throughout our interviews. The be just as important as its national origin in notion of cultural distance relates to landetermnining locational choices. We have drawn guage, in the first place. One of the attraccomparisons between European and American tions of Great Britain and the Benelux firms in chemicals; automotive vehicles and countries for Japanese investors is the fact parts; telecommunications; electrical equipment that the language obstacle is largely absent, and electronics; and hotels. or at least greatly reduced. The situation is quite different in the countries to the east and
The Chemicals Industry (Table 10 ) south of the EU. But the problem goes beyond language, and the feeling of being in Preference ratings with respect to core countries an unknown, perhaps even hostile environare much the same for European chemical firms ment also has to do with an inability to as for European firms on the whole. As to the understand local behavior and values. Firms other countries, Morocco and Tunisia fared betinterviewed complained of how hard it was ter that they did in the sample-wide rankings. to identify reliable local partners that they American chemical firms also show the same could fully trust. In contrast, they stressed the preferences as the broader sample among their ease of doing business in Asia, where "everycompatriots. In contrast to the Europeans, howthing is simple". We might add that our interever, they place Morocco and Tunisia further viewees seemed in general to be insuffidown the list than do the sample-wide rankings. ciently informed about other countries.
The major difference between the ways American and European firms view country attractiveIn the final analysis, the only ex-COMECON ness lies in the higher ranking the Americans countries that evoke any positive reaction among accord to the territories of the former Soviet Japanese investors are those that have natural Union, and the better score the Europeans give to resources, and where Japan has had a longPortugal, Morocco and Tunisia. standing trading relationship. Such places are limited essentially to Siberia and the Asian Automotive Vehicle and Parts Makers (Table 11 ) republics of the former Soviet Union. Hungary is something of an exception within Central Market-seeking firms in the European automoEurope, explained in part by the fact that a few tive industries stand out from the broader Eurosogo shosha were trading there before 1989, and pean sample in placing less priority on Asian the President personally invited a car-making markets. Turkey and Poland are in the lead. firm to set up a plant there. In addition, Hungary Thailand drops to fifth place, level with Russia has high-level scientists that can be recruited for and ahead of Portugal. Hungary does not appear R&D programs (one example of which involved at all among the core countries. developing a new electric insulator).
American companies also place Turkey in first Among the countries of the Mediterranean place in terms of market interest, followed by Rim, where the cultural distance is seen as even Russia and Portugal; Poland makes it only to fourth place. Thailand and Malaysia come sixth gary first, banish Russia to thirteenth place. In and seventh, on the margins of the core group.
contrast, European firms in the electrical sector, Asian countries fare no better with firms for while citing Russia as their favored location, put which cost minimizing is the priority. Here, Hungary in only seventh position, whereas those European firms place Poland, Turkey and Portuin the electronics sector place Russia sixth, and gal ahead of Malaysia and Thailand. These latter Hungary third. two get the same grade as Egypt, a country that usually ranks far behind them. American compaHotels (Table 14 ) nies are no more partial than the Europeans to Asian countries. They prefer Hungary and European hotel firms diverge from the overall Poland, in that order.
sample by refusing to place Asia at the head of their list of most attractive locations. They prefer Telecommunications (Table 12) Portugal, then Hungary. This reversal of priorities, however, does not prevent the identify of the Compared with the general European samnple, core countries from being the same as that for the telecommunications firms stand out by ranking broader sample-Russia nevertheless comes out CEE markets ahead of those of Asia. Hungary slightly better. Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt are at and Poland are ahead of Thailand. The markets the bottom of the list-their attractiveness is of Russia, Lithuania and Slovakia are on an equal ranked the same as that of Slovakia or Lithuania. footing, just behind Portugal and Malaysia and American hotel firms have a similar percepahead of Turkey.
tion as European firms when it comes to American firms also give Hungary first place, Morocco and Tunisia, but they give them better in a tie with Turkey. Tunisia, Morocco, and espeabsolute marks. Egypt, in contrast, maintains its cially Turkey receive higher rankings than they allure and comes in second, level with Malaysia. do from European firms.
Thailand is the hands-down winner, receiving the highest possible score (5) from the firms The Electrical and Electronics Industries (Table 13) interviewed. Russia, Hungary and Turkey are tied for third place. Portugal, the favorite of Compared with the full sample of European European firms, comes next. firms, companies in the electrical industry differ by giving Russia third place among countries in Textiles and Apparel (Table 15 ) which they would invest for market reasons.
American firms in the electrical and electronics European firms investing for the local market industry stick to the rankings of the broader prefer to remain in Europe, and divide their American sample. The only notable discrepancy is favors evenly between two Southern and two the higher ranking given to Russia (which is tied Eastern European countries. Asia is left to fourth with Turkey for fourth position) and to Ukraine, place. Morocco and Tunisia bring up the rear. which follows right behind those two. As long as This ranking is reversed for firms seeking to market considerations are dominant, American reduce costs by setting up abroad. Here, Morocco and European electrical-goods firms alike relegate is in the lead, and Tunisia in fourth place. PortuTunisia and Morocco to the bottom of the list. On gal and Poland, which were ranked first and secthe other hand, European electronics firms give ond by market seekers, now lag behind seven these two countries a higher ranking.
other countries. Yet there is a cluster of countries By the same token, firms investing for cost that are seen as attractive from both strategic reduction purposes, regardless of their nationalviewpoints: Turkey, Thailand and Ukraine. ity, put Morocco and Tunisia in last place. ArneriOur sample of American firms in this sector can electrical and electronics firms, and Eurowas too thin to allow any meaningful comparipean electrical firms, give first place to nonsons. It seems however that the only firm interAsian countries: Hungary in the first case, Russia viewed (the others refused to take part in the in the second. survey) has set up plants in Africa, in Hungary To illustrate the variety of view points among and in Poland. These countries are a source of firns belonging to high-tech sectors, it is noteinexpensive factors of production, as well as worthy that American firms, while placing Hunoffering a base of access to the European market.
In conclusion, the results of our survey offer the market-seeking and the cost-reduction strateirrefutable evidence that national origin and gies, is consistent with the idea that multinationindustrial sector both play a role, albeit a marals are less interested in either big markets ginal one, in determining company locational wihout conditions for world-competitive prochoices. Their influence makes itself felt mainly duction, or in pure export platforms, than they in the ranking of countries within the core group, used to be. Rather, they more and more seek sites rather than in determining the membership of that offer both market access and conditions for that group. It thus appears that European firms world-competitive production. Therefore, the have a higher preference for Portugal than do strict opposition between horizontal and vertical American firms. The latter show a particular FDI investment strategy is not relevant to base a preference for Hungary, and a tendency to rank clear-cut distinction between FDI strategy Russia somewhat higher than do European according to the fact that the host-countries are investors. The preeminence of the core countries belonging to the North or to the South. In fact, is rarely challenged-only in the cases of the texthe core countries are belonging jointly to the tile and apparel industry, where Morocco comes North and to the South. Perhaps it would be out as the favorite of European firms, and the more relevant to say that they belong neither to hotel industry, where American companies prethe North nor to the South. As a matter of fact, fer Egypt. And, as already explained, in these firms' global strategy does not follow the acatwo sectors most foreign involvement is not actudemic distinction between horizontal and vertially investment but rather takes other forms such cal strategies which is based on the concepts of as subcontracting or management contracts.
the new international trade theory. Multination-A general remark relates to Russia's ranking in als are using both strategies at the same time. company preferences. It is clear that the Russian
The survey data are not sufficiently represenmarket is attractive for investors, whatever their tative to serve as a solid basis for generalizing nationality (although American firms are more much further, or for making reliable predictions. eager than Europeans), and whatever their sector Given the size of the sample, the answers (with companies facing saturated home marobtained at the individual European country kets-such as in automobiles or chemicalslevel or the sector level obviously give great being the first to look to Russia). If Russia can weight to the opinions of a very small number of manage to improve its economic and political stafirms. Then too, most of the companies interbility in the future, there is a good chance that the viewed are large multinationals, and are often trade-off effect might indeed move Russia conthe leaders in their market. It is reasonable to siderably higher in the group of core countries.
think that small and medium-sized firms might The fact that in most cases, the core countries take a different approach to judging country are attractive as investment locations under both attractiveness.
Different Investment Strategies: Their Nature, Their Effects, and Their Future
We have noted the existence of a division of may, over time, lead firms to abandon the curcountries in the investment strategies of MNCs:
rently predominant horizontal investment stratOutside the triad, which in general includes the egy in favor of a vertical one. A transformation most attractive countries, only a relatively small of this kind could create a new pattern for group (which we have called "core countries") Europe's industrial geography are on the short list for consideration of most foreign investments. Other countries are potentially "Vertical' vs. "Horizontal" Strategies attractive (if they can overcome some negative aspects that at present keep them off these short lists) while still others constitute yet a fourth, Nature of the Different Strategies peripheral group that lacks most of the basic attractive aspects. We have also identified the The firms interviewed look primarily for the core countries in our sample-some five to seven existence of a sufficiently large and dynamic out of the 13 we studied. market when selecting a country for direct Why do firms concentrate their interest within investment. Only in the textiles and apparel secthis small group of recipients? Our survey tor do firms place priority on the prices of factors results show that horizontal considerations are of production in different countries. These generally more important than vertical ones in responses can be interpreted in terms of an interguiding the strategies of the investors we studnational growth strategy by examining them in ied. If we can define these two approaches light of two theoretical models of reference. clearly, we will be able to pinpoint what it is that Both company surveys and economic analysis makes core countries attractive. But beyond that, suggest several rationales for FDI. These include: we can also appreciate the place that core coun-* the existence of protectionist barriers to tries occupy in the new world-wide organization trade in host countries of production. For the countries of the triad, where many industrial sectors can be considered * cutting production costs by reducing transmature, these lands represent a new frontier. Yet portation costs, taking advantage of cheap shifting productive capacities towards the core labor, gaining access to raw materials countries in this way is not an urnmixed blessing * stretching out product lffe cycles. for such firms. When we pressed the point a little more deeply during our interviews, we discov-* oligopolistic competition and desire to ered concerns about a "backwash effect", which maintain market share, with its "bandcan cast a pall over companies' enthusiasm for wagon effect" and the game of threat and multi-country expansion. These counter-forces counter-threat * reducing business costs by internalizing them nance is even more striking when we recall that * reducing risk through geographic diversifi-80 percent of direct investment not confined cation, etc.
within the triad goes to the 10 most industrialized countries of the developing world (World All these determinants can however be Investment Report, 1995). grouped together around two foreign investment
In contrast to the horizontal strategy, the coststrategies: the market or horizontal strategy, and minimization or sourcing approach is referred to the cost-minimization or vertical strategy. The by the above-quoted authors as the "global" or questionnaire submitted to firms during the FIAS "vertical" approach. These two are not, strictly survey was implicitly based on this dichotomy.
speaking the same; rather the global strategy can The horizontal or market-seeking strategy be seen as a more evolved form of the vertical. describes investment decisions that involve
In a simple vertical strategy, direct investment establishing local branch plants. It is also flows are determined by differentials in factor referred to as a "multidomestic" strategy (Porter, endowments among countries at various stages 1986) or, more recently, as a "horizontal" strategy of development. The flow is thus one-way, and (Brainard, 1993; Markusen, 1995) . This strategy is represents a unilateral flow from North to South. in effect the extension of a firm's export strategy It is also vertical in the sense that branch plants by other means, by setting up "stand-alone subare located so as to match their microeconomic sidiaries" (Michalet, 1976) . The market in quesproduction functions with macroeconomic factor tion may be either the domestic market of the endowment. Thus, the production units that are target country, or a broader regional market than relocated abroad are specialized. can be accessed through that country.
In the more evolved form we can speak of a Output from a subsidiary is usually intended global approach. As described most famously by for local markets. Exports are a minor considerPorter, in this paradigm all of the firm's activities ation. Subsidiaries produce consumer goods, (its "value chain") are broken down and alloequipment or intermediary goods that differ litcated among integrated subsidiaries using the tle from products made in the firm's home counmost cost-effective productive factor in each try, in terms of product range, production techcountry. As a result, the various subsidiaries of niques, technological content, marketing etc. the same multinational firm will be significantly Any modifications needed to adapt them to local interdependent.. There is an internalized network market conditions are generally marginal.
through which components, intermediary goods The horizontal strategy is often, although not including even internal services such as accountalways, applied to economies that are at roughly ing and R&D, and technology can flow not only the same stage of development. The host counbetween individual subsidiaries and the parent tries will have a comparable income per capita, company, but indeed among the subsidiaries. equivalent technology potential, similar conThe global or evolved vertical strategy represumer preferences, and a legal and regulatory sents in the end a process of worldwide integraframework based on common principles. tion that relies both on access to the cheapest facThis strategy is followed by multinationals that tors, and on the economies of scale generated by operate mainly in imperfect markets with oligopspecializing each subsidiary in the production of olistic or monopolistic features, characterized by certain goods or services. Investment flows under product differentiation. A company's competithe global strategy are more inter-sectoral (as contiveness is based on its intangible assets, its techtrasted with mostly intra-industry as with the hornological capital, its patents, its trademarks etc., izontal strategy), and thus seem more to reflect the which give it certain specific competitive advandassic logic of comparative advantage. A firm's tages that compensate for the added costs and competitiveness depends on minimizing its costs risks of doing business in foreign countries.
in markets where competition is based on price as The horizontal strategy leads to multi-direcwell as quality, rather than mostly on brand differtional investment flows within an industry. entiation and/or access to protected markets. Today, an overwhelming proportion of direct investment flows occur under this strategy: 97
The Strategies of the Interviewed Finns percent of such flows originates in triad countries, and nearly three-quarters is directed
There was a striking degree of convergence towards other triad countries. That predomiamong investors' responses when they were asked about their investment rationale. Quite their domestic markets. The countries on the independent of their nationality or their sector of south shore of the Mediterranean offer neither activity, they were nearly unanimous in placing vast domestic markets, nor access to a dynamic market considerations as the determining factor regional market. It is not surprising then that in their international growth strategy. However, they do not figure on the short list for internathis does not mean that investors are following a tional investors. They will be of prime interest to pure horizontal strategy, as it was defined in the firms pursuing a simple vertical strategyprevious section.
unfortunately these are few in number, outside The existence of a sufficiently large and fastthe textiles and apparel industry. growing market is the necessary condition for Firms in the textiles and apparel sector alone selecting an investment site. Yet we must be carehave a strategy that diverges from that of the ful in defining the concept of "market" that sample as a whole, to the extent that they pursue sometimes underlies these responses. Purely a sourcing or cost-minimizing strategy as domestic market size, i.e. the market of the host opposed to seeking market access through their country alone, is undoubtedly important in investments. Once again, we must qualify this country choice. But a potential host country will remark, by adding that direct foreign investment be even more attractive if, once an investment is is not very central to the strategy of most firms in made, goods can be exported to a dynamic the textiles and apparel sector. They are more regional market. The ideal core country is one inclined to proceed, in complementary or substithat offers at the same time a large enough tutive fashion, to make direct purchases or domestic market to justify an industrial investarrange sub-contracting with independent comment, and a launching pad into a regional marpanies located in a number of countries, along ket. It means that the ideal core country must the lines of a company network strategy.1 respond to both horizontal and vertical FDI stratIn this era where "globalization" is the major egies. One important implication of this analysis buzzword in discussions of multinational strateis that companies will not be willing to invest in gies, the fact that we found market-seeking to be all countries. In that sense, the careful selection of the predominant consideration in investment site one country for investment should reduce the location among such a large and diversified samneed for direct investments in neighboring counple of companies may seem to indicate a surpristries. This approach is quite similar to the "hub ing retrenchment in multinational corporate stratand spokes" model used by airline companies.
egy. The great majority of observers tend to look It should be no surprise to find, then, that Asia on the multidomestic or horizontal strategy, is the most attractive region in the developing based on a chain of stand-alone subsidiaries, as a world. Most of the firms interviewed stressed feature that was typical of the 1960s and 1970s. that this attractiveness does not rely solely on the The 1980s and 1990s were thought to mark the existence of large-scale and highly dynamic ascendancy of global strategies. In fact, the earlier domestic markets. It also is based on the fact that era was typified in developing countries by autarthe Pacific area is an ever more important chic development strategies based on import subregional market. This means that sales of subsidstitution behind protectionist barriers, while in iaries set up in one country of the region can be the North the Keynesian model held sway, chardirected simultaneously to the local market and acterized by heavy government intervention to the markets of neighboring countries. This through a powerful public sector, and a managed coincidence allows a degree of decoupling from economy replete with trade and exchange coneconomies-of-scale constraints. And it allows a trols. In this context, a "multidomestic" investfirm to reap the advantages of both a horizontal ment strategy was the most appropriate one. The and a vertical strategy. move to liberalization that was launched in the Within Europe, Portugal's attractiveness is early 1980s, with the lowering of tariffs and the closely related to its membership in the Euroopening of markets, meant that firms faced (a) the pean Union. Hungary's geographic position or challenge of losing protected single-country marthat of the Czech Republic between eastern and kets and (b) the increased opportunities of many western Europe, supported by historical tiesmore countries in which they could produce, from the Austro-Hungarian Empire to COMEexport from, and import to. This change induced CON-give these two countries as well an attraca growth in vertical strategies. Technological tiveness that goes beyond the limited potential of advances, especially CAD-CAM and instant international data transmission, combined with foreign investment, they are not in themselves the increased country opportunities to lead many sufficient conditions. In their responses, the firms MNCs toward more truly interdependent, global interviewed noted a series of complementary strategies.
factors that will govern theirfinal decision about Several explanations can be offered for the whether to invest in a country that meets the apparent paradox that springs from our survey basic conditions. These further factors are, results. First, it may be prudent to take a grain of indeed, what will determine whether a country salt with prophecies that, however, gripping, are finds itself among the core countries, or is left on often far removed from the facts, or too much the list of countries whose attractiveness is still ahead of the slow and tortuous pace of change.
only "potential". Next, we need to apply the closest scrutiny to off-the-cuff remarks that managers may make Political and Economic Stability during interviews, by matching up their answers to different questions and trying to interpret All the companies interviewed considered it apparent contradictions in their statements.
indispensable to make a thorough assessment of We can identify more clearly the context of a country's economic and political stability opinions given during an interview, by applying before any investment decision could be taken. three complementary perspectives to the initial This stability is a precondition for being able to statement:
base decisions on investment plans and calcu-* Yes, (local or regional) market size and lated expected returns. dynamism are a necessary condition for putThis point was given particular emphasis with ting a country on multinationals' short lists, respect to Russia and the other countries of the but they are not by themselves a sufficient former Soviet Union. It is clear that, despite the condition.
tremendous investment opportunities that Russia and some of the rest of these countries offer, * Yes, firms' current foreign investment stratethere is a negative perception of their political gies are based more on horizontal than vertiand economic context that frequently inhibits a cal approaches (except for the textile and final decision to invest. Many firms have apparel industry) but we cannot completely adopted a "wait and see" strategy, while at the equate the core countries with the triad same time ensuring that they will be ready to countries. Thus, the flows of investment move if and when the situation improves. To this from the home countries of the firms we end, firms tend to prefer building a market presinterviewed-all of which are triad counence of the kind that minimizes the risk of capital tries-to the core countries list are not perlosses-thus they will enter into management fectly horizontal.
contracts, joint ventures with local partners, -Yes, the investment strategy that stands out licensing agreements, sub-contracting, distribuin our interviews is closer to the multition agreements, etc. If they do make a direct domestic than the global model, but the investment, they try to keep the amount of their "backwash effect" that relocation can have commitment to a minimum. The firms interon the home country has more to do with viewed showed a clear desire-most frequently the globalization process, even if this is limwith respect to Russia itself-to transform these ited to a regional rather than a world-wide transitional arrangements as soon as the shortscale.
term outlook becomes less uncertain. Their concern about being ready to seize the opportunity Thesethre remaks mke cear te ned to as soon as the investment climate turns around is take other attractiveness factors into account reinforced b the threat of heavy com etition than those related to the dichotomy of horizontal from other by tipatiof he "firstion versus vertial strategy from othermultinationals. The "first mover" versus vertical strategy.
theme is a key part of their approach.
This exact attitude and behavior was wideOther Determinants of Investment spread among MNCs in the early days after China opened up, beginning in 1979. While market potential and dynamics represent
The dampening effect of political risk also necessary conditions in selecting a country for shows up with respect to other countries. It is a constant background concern when discussing that labor market conditions are unimportant in countries along the Mediterranean south shore, how investors view a country's attractiveness, and it is very explicit for European investors conregardless of their strategic approach. All the templating the hotel sector in Egypt. It is interfirms interviewed, whatever their home country, esting that American investors do not seem to whatever their industrial sector, stressed that the have the same preoccupation about the impact availability of qualified manpower is a major that acts of terrorism may have on tourists' consideration. Many "stand-alone subsidiaries" choice of destination-perhaps because the firms typical of the horizontal approach use the same, interviewed are more oriented towards business increasingly sophisticated technology as that travelers than vacationers.
employed at home, and this demands properly educated local personnel, particularly for midThe Legal Climatefor Business dle-ranking and senior technical positions. Our survey confirmed that low wages by themselves The legal and regulatory framework governing are no longer a sufficient attraction. On the other private business activities should also be stable, hand, the fact that the CEE countries have spetransparent and reliable. This in turn requires cialized engineers and scientists in key sectors, several elements. First, the rules of the game many of whom once worked in the militarymust be reasonably stable. Some of the execuindustrial complex, has led several American tives we interviewed said that they would be firms in the electronics and telecommunications more comfortable dealing with a country where industries to sign long-term agreements with the government imposes constraints up-frontlaboratories and research centers in Ukraine, for example, local content requirements in the Lithuania and Hungary, as an integral part of automotive industry-and then sticks to them their R&D programs. subsequently, than they would with a country During our interviews, the discussion of qualithat was permissive initially, but then changed fications and skills expanded to cover the capacthe rules of the game-as has happened to Amerity of local firms to meet the needs of subsidiarican automobile makers in Malaysia and Thaiies in terms of technical specifications and land. Second, the judicial system should be able product quality. The technical standards and the to enforce laws and contracts effectivelymanagement efficiency of local industry were promptly and honestly. Third, and just as imporoften mentioned as factors determining attractant, once a decision is taken to invest, once the tiveness. Even companies in the textile and subsidiary is up and running, the investor's sucapparel sector shared this concern, although they cess in keeping business costs to a minimum will tend to follow a vertical strategy. Several such depend on having a climate that is free of bureaufirms, including some American ones, pointed cratic interference, nit-picking controls, and arbiout that the textile industries in Asian countries, trary decisions. A government whose basic and in particular those of South Asia (Pakistan, approach to business is facilitating, rather than India) and China, have an advantage over the harassing, is an important dimension in assesscountries of the Maghreb because they have a ing a country's business climate, and a major reamore efficient and experienced work force. The son for choosing one location over another, a availability of an adequate industrial infrastrucpoint made by all the firms interviewed.
ture is also an important consideration for automotive vehicle and parts makers. For them, Qualified Labor and Industrial Strengths countries like Hungary and Portugal are especially attractive because they have accumulated For firms that adopt a vertical strategy, factor more than 30 years of industrial experience in costs, and in particular the cost of labor, plays a this sector, thanks to their specialized production determining role in foreign investment decisions.
within COMECON or their integration in the This is not the case, however, for firms pursuing European Economic Community, respectively. a horizontal strategy-for them, the domestic market in a low-wage country is not likely to be Communications Systems very attractive, except perhaps for continentsized countries such as China or India. Yet A multinational's operating efficiency depends despite this point, it would be wrong to condude in large part on the quality of communications between its far-flung subsidiaries and the rest of officialdom, there are the problems of dealing the world, including the home office. A dysfuncwith surplus staff in the enterprises themselves, tional telecommunications system in a country the need to reduce pollution, and the fact that can cause an investor to regret his initial choice many industrial units and hotel complexes are to locate there. Subsidiaries need to be able, on a built on too vast and cumbersome a scale to be day-to-day basis, to send and receive faxes and run at a profit. e-mail, make telephone calls etc. They also need Yet, despite these difficulties and frustrations proper transportation links, both within the (which incidentally seem more frequent in the country and to the outside world. From this Czech Republic than in other CEE countries), viewpoint, the development of industrial zones there is no doubt that the opportunities opened should not be limited to simply putting up buildup by privatization are a real inducement to ings, as is frequently the case: it must be accominvestment in the former COMECON zone. This panied by all the logistical supports that subsidis a dimension that is, by contrast, seldom meniaries will need to conduct their business tioned in connection with prospects in Asia or effectively.
the Mediterranean Rim. That difference reflects not only the relatively wider range of privatizaPrivatization Programs tion programs that have been undertaken in Eastern Europe and Russia, but also the fact that Most of the firms interviewed-except the Japathe pressure of competition among multinationnese ones-mentioned privatization programs as als is much stronger there than in the other two a major investment opportunity in Russia, and 'regions. A firm that fails in its bid under a particeven more in Central Europe. Yet this dimension ular privatization may find itself excluded from does not appear to be a key element in the final that market, permanently or for a long time. This investment decision. On one hand, European risk is especially severe in the case of sectors and American companies are interested in the where economies of scale are important, such as possibilities opened up by the sale of statechemicals, electricity generation or luxury hotels, owned enterprises. From a horizontal investwhere there is room for only a very small numment viewpoint, the main interest in buying a ber of players, given the size of the market. A public enterprise is to acquire its market share.
country that might otherwise offer only a limited Taking over the productive facilities is generally or latent appeal may suddenly become much a secondary consideration, and may even be seen more attractive when looked at from a long-term as a drawback. In fact, most enterprises in the perspective of competing worldwide in an ohformer socialist countries will require heavy gopolistic environment. That is certainly an injections of new investment to rehabilitate them. important advantage that CEE countries have Most of the firms interviewed, whatever their over the countries of the Mediterranean. sector-from telecommunications to hotelswere fairly negative about their experience with Fiscal Incentives privatization programs to date. The only cases of outright failure in the foreign investment strate-A minority of firms polled cited the existence of gies that we encountered during our survey had host-government incentives, in the form of tax to do with privatization operations. Buyers comholidays or subsidies, as a factor that can plained that the responsible officials, even when enhance a country's attractiveness. One Amerithey could be clearly identified, often had no can auto maker mentioned Portugal as an examauthority to sign agreements. They stressed the ple, saying that tax relief and financial assistance difficulties of dealing with a constant turnover of from the European Union had played a role in its partners, which meant that negotiations were decision to set up shop there. continuously being set back to step one. They A few American firms expressed impatience complained that the assets of candidates for with their own government for not according privatization were overvalued, and the asking them the same degree of support as some Europrice for one or another enterprise was always pean governments do for their firms when it shifting, depending on whom they were talking comes to negotiating with the host government. to, or at what stage they were at in the negotiaThis argument was put most forcefully by firms tions. And on top of all these headaches with in sectors where privatization or deregulation is underway but where the responsible Ministries goods and hotels industries. It applies, then, to still have discretionary authority. This is particuall of the industries where a horizontal strategy larly the case in telecommunications, and in elecpredominates, with the exception of telecommutricity production and distribution.
nications. It concerns European firms more than others, and American firms that have subsidiar-
The "New Frontier" and the "Backwash Effect' ies in Europe. These firms in effect are faced not only with maturing markets in their industry, but also with the effects of a prolonged economic The "New Frontier" recession.
In this context, one significant comment was It is obvious that the core countries are not repeated many times during our interviews. equivalent to the triad countries as sites for FDI.
After stating that market is the number one Nevertheless, they are close enough in many determinant in selecting certain countries as respects that they represent a "new frontier" for locations for their business investments, managinvestors with home bases in the triad countries.
ers often added a reference, as if to underline this This new frontier consists of the development of point, to "the countries that offer new investthe core countries as attractive markets, in addiment opportunities". They supplemented their tion to (or replacing) their attractiveness as reference to the market by pointing to the major sources of low cost labor or other inputs.
difference between core countries and the firm's Firms that invest in the core countries belong home country. New and profitable investment to industrial sectors that are characterized by oliopportunities are no doubt more numerous in gopoly. Competitive advantage based on prodfast-growing, newly industrialized countries uct differentiation derives in the end from a such as Malaysia, Thailand or Turkey, and in the firm's "intangible assets". This feature explains transition economies of Eastern Europe and Rusthe answers firms gave when asked about their sia than in the more mature economies of the preferred forms of management control. More triad and especially those within the European than three-quarters of them said they prefer 100
Union. It is in the core countries that we find per cent control, or at least a majority interest "to ample unsatisfied demand for the kinds of conthe largest extent possible", i.e. when local legissumer goods and capital equipment that Eurolation does not prevent it (an increasingly rare pean and American firms are so good at making. obstacle, in any case). The quest for management It is there that one can still find fast-growing control through ownership of capital can be laid markets and new opportunities opened up by to several motivations, having to do with the the deregulation and transformation of public relationship between the parent company and its sectors that were formerly closed to competition subsidiaries, and with the relationships that by strict government controls. those subsidiaries are trying to build with local From this perspective, the core countries reprecompanies. But the strongest reason can be sent the new frontier of our day for companies found in the concern to preserve a firm's technofrom the mature economies of the triad. They do logical advantage, since this is what determines not belong to the category of peripheral countries its competitiveness. Firms in the textiles and where factor endowment, whether in terms of the apparel sector are the only ones that are not abundance of manpower or of natural resources, much influenced by this consideration. The techattracts vertical investment in the classic tradition nology employed in these industries is largely of international specialization among sectors. Neistandardized and is widely available. Competither do they belong to the triad, since they have tiveness in their case is essentially a question of yet to achieve the level of technological developprice and hence of costs. That is why they follow ment that would make them sources of innovaa vertical strategy.
tion and direct international investment in their The theory of the international product cycle own right. But they do offer a qualified and pro-(Vernon, 1966) holds, and experience has conductive manpower resource that is still relatively firmed, that highly oligopolistic industries that low-cost-and highly cost-effective-despite the produce differentiated goods are also industries rising purchasing power that feeds their dynamic facing home markets that are essentially satueconomies. Furthermore, the economic, social, rated. This point was mentioned specifically by institutional and technological environment in the firms in the chemical, automotive, electrical core countries tends increasingly to resemble that of more industrialized lands. This convergence local partners and are even driven to forge allimakes them ideal markets to absorb differentiated ances with American companies. The telecomproducts that are first launched in triad countries, munications sector should witness a growing and that may have a fairly long life span. It also number of three-way joint ventures, involving allows them to employ sophisticated manufacturmultinationals from different home countries, ing processes and transplanted production operaand local firms that are either publicly-owned or tions, thanks to their well-trained engineers, foreon the way to privatization. men, and work force.
In the hospitality industry as well, the opening Finally, to return once again to the two strategic up of the CEE countries, and the booming economodels presented at the outset, it seems that the mies of Asia and Turkey, have given a breath of attractiveness of the core countries does not relate fresh air to the major hotel chains, which found either to a pure vertical investment strategy, nor themselves scrambling during the 1980s to to a pure horizontal one. It relates, instead, to a expand their market shares in the triad countries mixed strategy that cannot be reduced to one or through continuous mergers and acquisitions. another rigid model, either vertical or horizontal.
The new opportunities also have the advantage This real-world mixed strategy is, moreover, in of situating them within a market niche popuconstant motion, since it is focused on countries lated by the favorite customers of the large luxor regions that are themselves caught up in a proury hotel chains-business people in the capitals found and fast-moving process of change.
and large metropolitan centers. Among the sectors where multinationals stand Firms in the chemicals, automotive and electo benefit most from the new frontier are hotels tronic and electrical equipment sectors also see and telecommunications, in the opening of the new frontier a way to move The telecommunications industry is of course beyond the saturated markets of the triad coungrowing rapidly, but competition is also intense tries. But, because their goods are tradable within the markets of the triad. American and among countries, their enthusiasm is tempered European firms take advantage of the new by the constraints of large-scale production typiopportunities offered by the core countries in cal of these industries, which raise the risk that very different ways, even if both groups seem to backwash effects from their investments in core be attracted first and foremost by the lure of cuntries m reateor eaerteess-cape deregulation and privatization programs in CEE countries. American firms tend to capitalize on ity problems at home. the experience they have gained within their home country, whether in launching new prod-
The Backwash Effect ucts (cellular telephones, fiber optics, the switch from analog to digital systems etc.) or in coping By the very fact that they are so attractive for with the newly deregulated rules of the game in investors, the core countries are likely to become their particular industry. American firms thus formidable competitors for the triad countries. In find themselves in a position of world market fact this is already happening, mostly from the leader for equipment and above all for the supsoutheastern Asia core countries. The thrust to ply of services, for such market segments as data relocate productive facilihties that is driving the transmission services for multinationals, or solvinvestment flow from the triad towards Asia, ing problems of communication over vast rural Eastern and Central Europe, Turkey and soon distances. The core countries offer them a fresh perhaps to Russia, will in time raise ever more field to exploit their know-how and experience.
pointed questions of regional industrial restrucThe situation with most European telecommuturing . As far as the favored countries in southnications companies is radically different. They ern and eastern Europe, the backwash effect is of have for the most part sprung from the public concern first and foremost to the countries of the sector, and must now face up to the loss of their European Union. monopoly home market as deregulation
In sectors where economies of scale dictate the progresses. Expansion towards the core counconstruction of large production units, the opentries is for them a way to make up for the ing of new productive capacity abroad and the expected losses from the opening of their home acquisition and modernization of state entermarket. Their international experience is often prises in a growing number of countries to the extremely limited. They therefore need to find south and east will tend to aggravate existing problems of over-capacity in triad countries, quasi-monopoly in the largest possible foreign starting with those of the European Union. Euromarket-either national or regional-without pean firms fear competition from exports coming being obliged to re-export some part of its output out of Eastern Europe, many of which are made back to the home country. there by their own subsidiaries. To the extent Automobile makers are cutting back the numthat this new productive capacity can make use ber of assembly plants and are concentrating of the latest technology in countries where unit them near to their largest markets, to take maxicosts are lower, multinational conglomerates are mum advantage of economies of scale. A decibound to face the question, sooner rather than sion will be made to set up an assembly unit if later, of rationalizing their productive facilities market studies show that sales will exceed on a regional basis.
200,000 cars per year. The list of countries where The quest for economies of scale is leading to Renault or Fiat will keep large-scale subsidiaries specialization of productive units. As redundant intersects with our core countries. At the same units are identified in one country or its neightime, they are trying to reduce their direct investbor, some sites will inevitably have to be shut ments in countries of secondary importance, serdown. Those that remain will progressively vicing those markets instead with exports from become specialized producers for a regional regional centers. The auto parts makers follow market, as part of the drive for greater efficiency.
the builders. They invest in the same countries, The dynamics of restructuring Europe's indusclose enough to the assembly plants that they trial landscape could therefore lead to the unexcan practice "just in time" supply. Nor is their pected transformation of the horizontal investattitude likely to be changed by low-wage argument strategy into a vertical or global approach.
ments. As one auto-parts firm put it, "countries Or to express this possible development in other are wasting their time with these arguments. The terms: once firms have stabilized their market only way to get us to come to them is to get the shares in the various core countries on the basis auto makers in first". of a multidomestic strategy, they will be drawn But no auto makers will venture into a country into the further step of adopting a more differenwith an insufficient market-except, as one or tiated and specialized-i.e., global-strategy.
two firms pointed out, if that country undertakes According to this hypothesis, the process of to protect it from further comers. In any case, the rationalizing productive capacities built or production of automotive parts and components acquired during the multinational expansion is becoming more and more capital-and technolphase could lead to the transformation of standogy-intensive. In a brief to a British parliamenalone subsidiaries into integrated subsidiaries.
tary committee, the parts maker, GKN, indicated This shift is most likely to take place first at the that its wage costs had dropped from 35-40 per regional level: moving from a multidomestic cent of total costs during the 1980s to 25-30 per strategy to a global strategy does not necessarily cent in the 1990s. They also pointed out that as a mean adopting a worldwide strategy.
result of the rationalization efforts that they, like The risk of such a backwash effect is most so many companies in mature industries, had acute in industries such as chemicals, automomade over the course of the previous decade, the biles, electrical equipment and electricity generawork force at GKN had shrunk from 69,000 tion and distribution. Firms in our sample employees in 1980 to 12,000 by 1992. This result belonging to these sectors were quite explicit reflected a long process of plant closures, about their concerns. In chemicals, facing an retrenchment and disinvestment. Nissan execuover-capacity problem, American and European tives say that the increased technological sophisfirms have been engaged since the late 1980s in a tication of many of their parts has made the continuous process of downsizing and rationalUnited States a lower-cost production site than izing their output. The idea of investing in new Mexico. The lack of enthusiasm among automocapacity runs counter to this policy. Yet the contive firms for undertaking new investments now straint of economies of scale has the effect of limbecomes more readily understandable. In the iting the number of productive units that a single case of parts makers, they are increasingly resortcountry market can profitably support. The most ing to sub-contracting activities. important thing is to be "first on the ground".
In short, the backwash effect can act as a brake The ideal situation, to judge from the interview on the ability of firms to take full advantage of results, would be one where a firm can enjoy a opportunities offered by the new frontier, if they are in industries plagued by over-production.
account. It becomes part of the process of indusFrom the responses of firms interviewed, it trial rationalization on a regional basis. The appears that this situation is felt more acutely trade-off in practice today has more to do with with respect to investments in European core redistributing industrial plants, rationalizing countries than in those of the Pacific region. This networks of final producers and their suppliers, is probably why European firms seem to be more and putting together geographic clusters, than concerned by this issue than are American firms.
with any kind of simpler arbitrage or competiThis difference of view has perhaps a double tion between individual countries. In the process explanation. On one hand, American firms have a of globalization, national boundaries lose much longer history of industrial relocation, to places of their relevance in any case. Nevertheless, it is like Southeast Asia and Mexico. Secondly, the geonot certain that this new industrial geography graphic proximity variable is less important than will be of equal benefit to Westem and Eastem it is for European firms. And then there is the fact Europe. Most firms anticipate a gradual slippage that a portion of American multinationals' direct towards the East. investment in CEE and southern European countries is made by subsidiaries located within the European Union-to this extent, therefore, they Notes are in a similar position to native European firms.
In the end, the question of trade-off becomes Our company interviews demonstrated the tutional frameworks, their economic environextent to which firms take a similar view of ment and their competitive advantages. country attractiveness, regardless of their Whatever their country of origin, whatever national origin or industrial sector. We found their industrial sector, there is a common core to that in this common view, the 13 countries in our most firms' views about what makes a place sample were fairly clearly divided into two attractive. The major determinants of investment groups: one, which we called the "core group," is site location can be arranged in a triptych as fol-"on the map" of most multinationals; countries lows: political and economic stability and basiin that group are competing with the triad councally non-harassing government behavior, martries for FDI, and to some extent also competing ket potential, and technological capacity. This with each other. The other countries in our group triptych presents the necessary conditions for a are not on the map of most multinationals' country to make it onto the long list-potential investment considerations. From further data in core countries-but they are not in themselves the interviews, and our own studies of the counsufficient conditions for inclusion on the short tries as well as past experience, we tried to list-actual core countries. understand the criteria that determine the memThis common basis underlying firms' percepbership of the core group of countries-i.e. what tions of country attractiveness should not be it takes to put a country on the FDI map.
taken to mean, of course, that firms do not look If, for a developing or transition country, the beyond these three dimensions, or that different ultimate goal of investment promotion policy is firms do not give somewhat different weights to to bring it into the group of core countries, or to various elements. The final choice between keep it there, then the design of that policy must potential investment candidates will depend on take account of what potential investors have in a series of factors that are specific to each firm. mind by attractiveness. (The same goes, of Closer investigation of investment strategies will course, for policies aimed at inducing firms reveal dimensions that can be traced back to a already in a country to stay there, and for firm's business or its corporate culture, which in encouraging domestic firms to invest). The short turn is partially a reflection of its national origin. list of core countries, of course, is not carved in
In the approach taken here, we make no stone. It will change from time to time, as attempt to take account of all the many factors regional prosperity and perhaps geographic that influence a final decision to invest. Our preferences change. It will also vary as firms intent is more modest: it aims primarily at change their investment strategies, and as counexploring the broad lines of a policy for attracttries succeed in adjusting their political and instiing foreign investment, and for helping a country to move inward through the various circles that tages, as well as its weaknesses from a locational will bring it closer to the core countries group. A point of view. dual perspective is needed. On one hand, there is the issue discussed at the outset of this study, Limitations of this Method namely to assess the impact that the opening of the CEE countries might have on FDI going to This approach has two major drawbacks. First, it the developing countries of the Mediterranean involves a great deal of work, both in preparing Rim and elsewhere. Secondly, we must deal with the diagnosis, and in putting together suitable the concept of attractiveness, not in terms of recommendations. Planners who use this contrade-off, but rather in terms of examining the ventional method put themselves in the position thresholds of the series of concentric circles that of poor Sisyphus. While it may not be explicit, were identified above, and that allow us to disthe ultimate goal of the exercise is to bring the tinguish between countries of the triad, the core country's attractiveness as near as possible to countries, those with potential, and those on the perfection. After much effort, all the variables periphery. With this two-pronged approach, we should merit top ranking. Once this is achieved, can sketch out the priorities for an attractiveness the hope is that investors will flock to this new policy that will let a country take advantage of paradise of their own accord. Yet when we purthe dynamics of globalization to move inward, sue this logic to its end, it becomes clear that the from a less-favored circle to the next moreapproach is unrealistic, for two principal reafavored one.
sons. The first has to do with the fact that being attractive does not require that a country has The Conventional Approach reached an ideal state in every one of the dimensions selected. Certainly none of the core counThe customary method for defining a foreign tries identified in our survey are perfect in that investment promotion policy is to begin with an sense. Nor is this surprising-to think that such in-depth analysis of a country's locational an ideal can be attained is to suppose that the strengths and weaknesses. On the basis of such a problem is solved. In fact, the basic difficulty diagnosis, possible remedial actions can then be with attractiveness policies is precisely this recommended. This is the broadest approach. It attempt to reach an ideal state that we know is is no doubt useful initially for identifying the unachievable. The attempt is bound to fail, for conditions a country needs to fulfill in order to two reasons. be attractive, but it has the drawback of diverting First, success would imply that countries attention away from the most important whose attractiveness is still only potential or player-the investor himself. In its crudest form, peripheral can somehow, by waving a magic it starts from an implicit premise that all a counwand, transform themselves instantly into core try has to do to attract foreign investors is to countries or triad countries. And to make that improve its political, institutional and economic happen would surely require a great deal more environment. Unfortunately, this is far from a than a foreign investment promotion policy. Secsure thing.
ond, a country's attractiveness cannot be defined without reference to company investment strate-A Two-step Approach gies. These can change, and indeed one of the causes of such change is exactly changes in counTo prepare a preliminary diagnosis of a country's tries' policies! If a survey like the one on which attractiveness, it is useful to draw up a comprethis study is based had been taken a decade ago, hensive checklist of features. Box 1 below preor if it were to be repeated ten years from now, sents a quick overview of the many kinds of data the results would likely be different. It must be that need to be collected and assessed.
remembered that the international flow of direct The next step is to compare one country's investment began in earnest more than thirty scores on the checklist against those of all other years ago, at a time when most developing councountries competing in the trade-off or competitries were in the sway of nationalistic and intertion by which firms are presumed to make their ventionist policies. And yet that did not totally investment location decisions. This comparison discourage the multinationals from investing. should then point to a country's absolute advanTheir investment strategies at that time must have been governed by different criteria from between these zones-a contrast that has noththose that prevail today.
ing to do with the idea of trade-off-does not In the second place, this shopping list mean that everything is perfect in the Asian core approach, with its basket of criteria, is essentially countries. It does suggest, however, that firms static. It ignores the fact that enhancing a councan find what they need there in order to try's attractiveness will depend in large part on strengthen their global competitive position and increasing the foreign presence locally. But fortheir global profitability. (By "global", we mean eign direct investment brings with it intangible here their consolidated performance, taking all assets such as technology, management knowof their activities into account, including those in how and quality standards that almost all develother regions of the world, and particularly in oping countries today find difficult to develop their own, industrialized home countries.) by themselves within a time frame acceptable to An immediate benefit of this approach is to be them. This is, in fact, the main justification for able to assess a country's potential attractiveness adopting a foreign investment promotion policy in terms of the three sets of priorities revealed in the first place-FDI is but a means to achieve during our interviews, and that we have used to development faster.
identify the small group of core countries. These Thus, the interaction between a country's related to economic and political stability and a attractiveness, and the transfer of skills and non-harassing government stance, market potenknow-how that direct investment entails, repretial, and the technological capacity of business sents a kind of dialectical relationship that goes and labor. far beyond the one-way causality that normally typifies such analysis. This dialectic between foreign investment and attractiveness lies at the the Keysto Success heart of any successful promotion policy. After
For developing and transition countries, the priorall, the reason why a government adopts a policy ities for governmuent polcy to attract investments to attract foreign investment in the first place is itie fined with toalttnctinvestments presumably because it hopes that such investmust be defined with the goal in mind of bringing ment will help to overcome perceived shortcomthe country within the group of core countries, ings in its domestic economy. It would be a misi.e., placing it on multinationals' short list. take, then, to insist that a country's economic
The commients below do not pretend to offer a and institutional environment must be made definitive or exclusive program. Such a task perfect before investment will come. Indeed, if would require us to study each country sepasuch perfection were possible, there would be no rately and in-depth. Yet, despite its level of genneed for any further investment promotion erality-or perhaps because of it-we can point efforts at all, since investment could be expected to some priority objectives for those countries of to flow in of its own accord.
Eastern and Central Europe and the MediterraTo escape from this dilemma, we need to idennean Rim that have not yet made it onto the tify the minimum conditions of attractiveness. investment short list. The way to arrive at this second-best solution is to do some severe prioritizing and pruning in Establishing a Stable and Facilitating Political and the shopping list used to diagnose a country's Economic Framework attractiveness.
We have said that a country's attractiveness In comparison with Malaysia or Thailand, as cannot be evaluated without taking into account investors see them, the CEE and Mediterranean company investment strategies. Attractiveness
Rim countries, such as Russia, Ukraine, Slovakia, results, first and foremost, from matching the Lithuania, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, that are offer of certain locational advantages against the not yet part of the core country group have in demands of potential investors. Our survey common the fact that they are still in transition showed that balancing of this kind has to a large towards a true market economy. extent been successfully accomplished in many This broad rubric, of course, subsumes great countries in East and Southeast Asia, whereas it differentiation among geographic areas and is far from achieved in much of the ex-COMEamong individual countries. The drive towards CON region or around the Mediterranean Rim.
economic liberalization was launched earlier in The contrast that firms constantly point to Arab lands than it was in the former command economies. It also had less ground to make up, frequently cited in connection with securing since the private sector already occupied a larger property titles in the CEE and Mediterranean rim space in the economies south of the Mediterracountries as well. The uncertainties faced by nean than it did in Eastern Europe. Yet from an investors in dealing with decentralized state investor's viewpoint, the two zones present agencies leads them to doubt the stability and some common characteristics that tend to disauthority of the central government, and to quescourage investment. The public sector still occution its commitment to economic liberalization. pies an important, even a dominant place in the And yet it is the prospect of changes in economic economy. Privatization programs have been policies that is most likely to lead an investor to undertaken only hesitantly and their results have consider setting up business in these countries. been slow and spotty (with a very few excepParadoxically, we find that some potential investions). Change is occurring, but only reluctantly.
tors, particularly those who had established a Powerful social groups still resist change, and business relationship with the countries under there are many examples of backsliding and pro-COMECON, now feel a certain nostalgia for the cedural roadblocks.
old regime. The heavy hand of the government and its
The overall outcome of such a situation, where bureaucracy is still felt in the day-to-day running investors are uncertain about a country's politiof the economy, and newcomers still find the cost cal and economic stability, is that they adopt a of doing business to be high. As firms are passed "wait and see" attitude. This is hardly what a down to the lower echelons of the hierarchygovernment hopes to achieve when it adopts a including the regional or municipal levels-to policy to attract foreign investment. And yet seek solutions to their plant site problems, they such policies are often accompanied by governare likely to run up against hostility, suspicion or ment promotional efforts that do not go over simply ignorance and incompetence on the part well with the international business community, of local authorities and elected officials. At these and that may even be counterproductive for the levels, the notion of providing services and facdlcountry's image. ities for business, such as is implied in a market
The negative impact that unstable rules of the economy, has not completely replaced the older game can have is clearly demonstrated in the style of bureaucratic controls and peremptory case of the former Soviet countries, notably Ruscommands. Lucky is the investor who succeeds sia and Ukraine. Among the countries in our in obtaining all the administrative approvals, the sample, Russia with its vast market might be permits, the water, telephone and road connecexpected to be best placed to join the circle of tions he needs. He may find that existing agreecore countries, if it could succeed in improving ments or contracts are disregarded or re-opened, its political and institutional environment and and may then have to resort to informal chanestablishing the rule of law. nels, or carry even the most elementary issue to
The experience of Morocco and Tunisia is the highest level, if he can, for satisfaction.
highly instructive in this regard. These two counThe weaknesses of the judicial system with tries have made undeniable progress in transrespect to the sanctity of contracts and recogniforming their institutional environment since the tion of property rights create a feeling of insecumid-1980s . And yet investors find them still rity and arbitrariness. Long-term commitment of handicapped by a certain lack of visibility and substantial investment funds seems foolhardy if credibility, and the consequent persistence of plans are challenged or overturned from day to outdated stereotypes. The recent signing of freeday, or whenever an official is replaced. The trade agreements with the European Union is a powers of such officials are difficult enough to clear demonstration of their determination to pin down; their responsibilities are often vaguely anchor themselves more firmly to the giant defined, and they may soon be shunted to a new neighbor across the Mediterranean, in much the position. Under such circumstances, it is hard to same way that Mexico undertook to join NAFIA. maintain continuity in negotiations that may be This new orientation should help to reassure broken off at any moment, and their results repupotential investors, but more concrete progress diated, because a new official is in charge.
beyond just the signing of international accords Examples of such behavior abound. They were is needed. And even that may not be enough to particularly noticeable during negotiations counter the perceived risk of contamination by under the CEE privatization programs, and are the religious fundamentalism now rampant in neighboring Algeria and Libya. Thus whether or Morocco. But these countries' attractiveness not Morocco and Tunisia will make it into the would no doubt be considerably enhanced if the core countries' club depends both on further planned customs union, which was to be set up actions within those countries and on variables among the members of the Arab Maghreb Union beyond their national context.
(created in 1969, with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, The situation in Egypt is more complex and Libya and Mauritania) were ever to become a more difficult. There, we find an unfortunate reality. Unfortunately the fate of this plan today combination of the institutional features of exremains very uncertain (FIAS, 1996) . As a result, socialist countries, in the form of a bureaucratic the countries around the Mediterranean south tradition with deep historical roots, and those of shore remain confined to exploiting their locathe Maghreb in the form of a resurgent, fanatical tional advantages based on factor endowment, Islam. Egypt's economic potential is more comi.e., their low-cost labor and their agricultural and pelling than that of the latter countries, given the mineral resources. This of course places them in size of its domestic market, but in many ways the head-to-head competition with some of the EU's conditions for private business there are worse own members, in such industries as textiles and today than in some of the former COMECON apparel and the food sector, and is not a recipe for countries.
fast development even if it were to succeed. some extent by sustaining a strong rate of impact of relocation on unemployment. Only a growth and ensuring a relatively equitable distrirecovery in the EU's growth rate is likely to bution of domestic income. But by far the best reduce this inhibition. response is to look to expansion and integration The horizontal investment strategy followed of the regional market. There are two ways of by most of the firms interviewed includes the going about this.
possibility of complementary investments, The attractiveness of the countries of Southwithin the same product or value chain, among east Asia does not depend solely on the size of countries and based on the play of comparative their individual domestic markets, but relies advantage. Thus, for example, Morocco (like increasingly on the emergence of a strong, Mexico) could produce computer keyboards dynamic regional market. These dual facets of while other parts of computers are produced the region's attractiveness were stressed many elsewhere. Extending this strategy to embrace times by the firms interviewed. Core countries both shores of the Mediterranean would have such as Malaysia and Thailand offer foreign the great advantage of reducing tensions generinvestors not only a significant domestic market ated when countries on both sides of the Medibut also an export base for gaining access to terranean try to produce identical goodsother markets within the region-as well as whether industrial or even agricultural. Such abroad including the United States and Japan. A neglect of possible gains from complementary similar dynamic can be expected in Mercosur, investments and the resulting complementary especially in Argentina which has both increased trade, a la Ricardo, tends to provoke constant its own attractiveness and also is gaining better confrontation in trade relations between the access to the Brazilian market.
southern members of the EU and the countries From this viewpoint, it is clear that the prime south of the Mediterranean. market for Tunisia must be the European Union.
But to the extent that a more generalized horiTo a somewhat lesser extent, the same goes for zontal strategy demands relatively large markets for its new plants, its field of application remains careers than to factory work. In striving to satisfy limited to the countries of the triad and the Asian the needs of these two elites-which are broadly core countries. Hence the concern on the part of reflective of the dominant social structure-these Central European countries to integrate themcountries have distorted their education budgets selves into the EU as quickly as possible. The to the point where a significant portion of the promise of membership that the EU has held out population is denied adequate training of any to them represents their surest and swiftest way kind. (This is particularly true in Morocco.) As a of joining the club. No similar offers have been result, the advantage they claim to have in terms made to the countries of the Mediterranean Rim, of low-cost labor, as featured prominently in except for Turkey. But it was likely with a view to their promotional campaigns, is a myth as far as the future extension of EU membership that the the foreign businesses that venture into the councountries of the Maghreb entered into free-trade try are concerned. These multinationals search agreements with the EU in 1995 and 1996. for the qualified workers they need to produce goods and services competitively for the world Building Human Capital and Technical Capacities market, and find that, if available at all, their scarcity value makes them far from low-cost. Strengthening a host country's technological
The reform of national education systems is thus a sine qua non if investment promotion polimnty promotion poicies wtr they are baese cies are to succeed. This is an especially imporment promotio pohcies whether theyarebtant competitive consideration for the countries on a horizontal or a vertical strategy. In both of the Mediterranean rim, since education is one cases, this is a key priority that relates both to of the strongest competitive advantages of the building human capital and strengthening the CEE countries-even those that are not on the technological capacities of companies, universishort list. Their productive, cost-effective human ties and research institutions, and the infrastruccapital is without a doubt the most valuable feature of business services ture that they have inherited from their former There are scarcely any industries where the regimes. Foreign entrepreneurs are unanimous availability of low-cost, unskilled labor is still the in their praise of the high quaifications of the sole determining factor of investment. Just as work force in many of the Central European technical progress substitutes capital for labor, it countries, its industrial experience, its reliabilalso demands a work force that can work effecity-and its modest pay expectations. This tively with increasingly sophisticated machines.
advantage, together with low transport costs, is Such machines are now beyond the skills of illitperhaps the most important factor driving the erate and uneducated workers. The labor comeastward relocation of European industry. (On ponent of production costs is steadily falling, the other hand, there are considerable reservaeven as wages and salaries are rising for the tions about the work force in the former Soviet more highly qualified and productive workers.
Union itself.) Countries that seek to take part in this happy The Asian core countries-which for the most process, and to attract new investments of the part owed their initial take-off to their pool of kind that can thrive in a world market where low-wage, educated but unskilled labor-have price and quality competition is intense, can no long since come to understand the prime imporlonger content themselves with advertising their tance of training. Following the example set by pool of cheap labor. They must also be able to Singapore in the late 1970s, countries like Malaydemonstrate that their work force is well edusia today place high priority on building their cated, so that it has or can readily be trained in human capital, a point that should be taken to the required skills.
heart by countries of the Mediterranean rim. This feature is still notably lacking in MediterClosely linked to the training issue is the quesranean countries. Education systems have tion of the capacity of local businesses to absorb neglected to provide the kind of training needed sophisticated modem technologies. Company at the intermediate technical and management managers and professional staff should not be level. They have focused on producing first-class overlooked in skills-upgrading programs. Busiengineers and professionals-who often comness schools, university-level technical and sciplete their training abroad-and generalists who entific training, and industrial research instituare more attracted to public administration tions are similarly important.
The competitiveness of local firms is yet home country. For the threatened European counanother important dimension of a country's tries, partnership with a Moroccan or Tunisian attractiveness. Foreign plants need local supplienterprise may help them to prolong their surers for goods and services that can match their vival behind the shelter of protectionist barriers. competitors on the world market in terms of But those days are drawing to a close. What price, quality and delivery. This is an indispensforeign firms are now seeking is local companies able condition for foreign subsidiaries that seek that have clear strengths in a specific field. Those to broaden their range of products towards more strengths will allow them to provide reliable and technology-intensive goods, and one that they competitive support for externalizing activities will insist on whether they are following a horithat were formerly performed in-house by the zontal or a vertical strategy.
firms themselves. The Japanese-style network From this viewpoint, the situation of ex-("keiretsu") pioneered by Toyota has been emu-COMECON countries and those of the Mediterlated in North America and Europe. Modernizaranean are fairly analogous. In both cases, a few tion and upgrading programs should be major conglomerates, often highly diversified, designed mainly in relation to the new opportucoexist with a great number of small enterprises.
nities of this kind that are now opening up, and The former are for most part in the public sector are sure to expand in the future, for companies in (this is the rule in the ex-socialist countries, and developing and transition countries. perhaps even more so in Egypt), and they Modernization programs need to be looked on account for the greater part of the country's outas an integral component of foreign investment put of industrial goods and public services. They promotion policies, in countries both to the East are highly inefficient, for the most part. The and to the South of Europe. Encouragement small enterprises, on the other hand, are often should be given to creation of "industrial disvery small-scale, family-based or cottage-type tricts"-the "clusters" of industries that Alfred businesses, with limited financial resources and
Marshall first identified at the beginning of this little ability to make use of sophisticated technolcentury. The existence of such clusters generates ogy. Few of them understand quality control, a specific investment climate, largely as a result adherence to delivery schedules, and the other of economic externalities that arise from the geonecessities required by their potential MNC cusgraphic proximity of production of both goods tomers. Many of them are at risk from falling and of specialized services. trade barriers, unless they are able to take advanDynamic competitive clusters can be expected tage of multilateral or bilateral funding proto have at least three beneficial effects on a coungrams to upgrade themselves, or can successtry's attractiveness. First, they should encourage fully integrate themselves into the production the restructuring of large public enterprises, network of some foreign firm. These firms may which is often a necessary pre-or concomitant be highly cost-effective in some senses, but even condition to privatizing them. Clusters could in the best-managed among them also need help to fact offer an appropriate framework for the varimeet the world-class quality and price standards ous components of a public enterprise to operate demanded by the multinationals who are their independently after it has been split up. In fact, it potential customers. (Battat et. al., 1996) is often easier to sell such firms in segments that The contrast between large and small-scale can be more readily acquired by private buyers. enterprises is sharper in the case of the MediterraPrivate buyers will shy away from taking over nean countries than in the CEE group. In the latan entire holding company or conglomerate of ter countries, there are a great number of the kind typically featured in privatization promedium-sized firms with relatively strong techmotion catalogues-the challenge of managing nological capacities. In Mediterranean countries, them efficiently is simply too much for most which have a greater gap to bridge, it is doubtful potential buyers. whether the long-favored conventional forms of Secondly, clusters can also offer an appropriate partnership with foreign firms are the best way to framework for upgrading small enterprises. This achieve the modernization of local enterprises.
effort demands far more than public subsidies and Arrangements of this type have generally training programs. Such assistance is often looked involved linkages to foreign SMEs, for the most on as a windfall or "freebie" by its beneficiaries, part European in the case of the Maghreb, and which means that they will never take full advantypically in sectors that are in decline in their tage of it as a means for transforming themselves.
29
The creation of clusters could encourage the kind backward linkages established by their subsidof mobilization and motivation that this effort iaries with local enterprises. Encouraging the demands-a dimension that is often missing from emergence of industrial districts would certainly programs that simply come from on high.
be the most realistic policy for preparing the The third beneficial effect of building clusters ground. Financial incentives, such as those prowould be to creat places and conditions where vided under investment legislation in the name foreign investors can find the proper environof regional development, and whose effectivement for developing their business. In return, ness on the location of investment is at best their own contribution will strengthen the clusdoubtful, should be focused exclusively on the ter's international competitiveness, through the development of clusters.
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Conclusion
Is there a trade-off among countries in attracting the same region. Thus, Hungary and Poland, and FDI? And, in particular, has the opening up of perhaps in some cases Turkey, do compete for Central and Eastern Europe diverted FDI that some investments. So do Malaysia and Thailand. otherwise would have gone to developing counIf we had included the whole world in our samtries, around the Mediterranean Rim or even furple, we probably would have found the Czech ther away? These were the basic questions at the Republic in the group close to Western Europe, origin of the research reported here.
and China, Indonesia, Singapore, and perhaps Our work shows that the trade-off, if it exists one or two others in Asia. There would have at all, has been minimal. Among Europe and its been a few in Latin America. But no more. neighbors, and indeed all around the world,
The "potential" countries-such as, in our investors do not see all countries in one category sample, Egypt, Morocco and perhaps Tunisiaof competing sites. We have been able to distinare almost but not quite in the same game. Rusguish several groups among the developing and sia is a special case, with its huge attractive martransition countries, which we have called "core ket but also its great risks and problems. But countries," "potential countries," and "peripheven Russia, and certainly the other potential eral countries"-in addition to the "triad" of countries, are in general not being considered industrial countries.
seriously for most investments that might go to Although these categories may be a little the core countries. For the potential countries, blurred at the edges, the basic differences among and even more for those on the periphery, most the groups are stark. Foreign direct investors, of the attractions for foreign investors are niche which means in effect multinational corporaattractions peculiar to the individual country. tions, choose overwhelmingly to invest in the These countries are in general not competing for triad of industrial countries-Western Europe, the kinds of FDI that choose where to go-they Japan and the United States. More and more, are not competing with each other, or even less especially in the last ten years, they are also with the core or triad countries. The opening of investing in the core countries-a small group of Central and Eastem Europe has had essentially developed and transition countries that have the no effect on the amount of FDI going to countries market access and the conditions for production such as Egypt or Morocco, and it has had even that make them attractive. Among the countries less effect on FDI going to the great number of we studied, Hungary, Malaysia, Poland, Portucountries on the periphery, which includes the gal, Thailand and Turkey are in this class. Russia rest of the Mediterranean Rim and, even more is a special case. Trade-offs do exist-investors so, Sub-Saharan Africa. do make some zero-sum choices-among core Multinationals, even in this age of globalizacountries and especially among core countries in tion, are not seeking to invest in all countries in the world. Rather, they seek to establish a presthis survey, we can attempt to suggest how the ence in a small number of countries, with worldclassification may change in the future. As competitive facilities that together strengthen already noted, most firms that are today taking a their regional or world-wide competitive advan-"wait and see" attitude with respect to Russia tages. With the recent strong trend for producers would be ready to commit themselves quickly if of final products to reduce drastically the numthey were to see convincing evidence of a more ber of firms from which they procure intermedistable and durable political situation. A sensible ate goods, this specialized focus on a relatively and credible tax reform, and reducing the small number of the best countries-the triad extreme problems of lawlessness that threaten and the core-may even narrow a bit.
business and personal safety alike, would also be However, the list of core countries is not a important. Looking ahead under their free-trade closed one. On the contrary, it is constantly changagreements with the European Union, if ing. The countries that find themselves at any Morocco and Tunisia were to undertake a masgiven time within the circle of potential countries sive effort to strengthen their education systems, have a good chance of making it onto the short list they could in time join the core countries club. that comprises the core. If that were not so, then They would also be better placed to take advanpolicies to attract investment would be futile. But tage of the possible weakening of the locational the challenge for the potential countries, and for advantages now enjoyed by countries such as those on the periphery as well, is not so much to Portugal and perhaps Hungary. The trend to riscompete by trying to divert FDI that is going elseing wages levels in those two countries could where. These countries need above all to impleenhance the relative attractiveness of the Maghment economic, legal, and institutional reforms. reb countries. They need to build up their strengths, and they
The attractiveness of countries is especially need to build upon their strengths to develop a hazardous to predict because it results from a long-term promotional strategy that will put them complex interplay of actions and reactions on the investors' short lists. This list-the group among the factors that attract foreign investment of core countries-is not fixed. Attracting FDI is and the shifting strategies of the firms themnot a zero sum game. As the explosion in the selves. As in the art of cooking, only ex pos t may amounts of FDI over the last ten years have we be able to tell whether the cake is doneshown, as more countries become truly attractive whether a country has made it to the core counsites, world-wide flows of foreign investment will tries list. We need to remember, too, that those increase. Potential countries can advance to the stars awarded to famous restaurants by gourmet core if they take the right measures.
guidebooks are not awarded forever, or excluSetting out scenarios for the future is beyond sively. Other restaurants willing to make the the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, in terms of effort can always win them in the future. 
Annex: Tables Showing Details of the Attractiveness
Scores of the 13 Countries in the Sample, According to Various Subdivisions of the Companies Surveyed
